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I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of the fourth amendment's protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures has long been debated. Great importance
is attached to the distinctions that determine whether a law enforce-
ment officer's glance, sniff, or listening ear is characterized as a search.
For if it is so characterized, fourth amendment protection is triggered
and the officer's conduct must be authorized by a search warrant or it
must fit within one of a few carefully defined exceptions to the war-
rant requirement.' To obtain a search warrant, an officer must prove
to a magistrate the existence of probable cause, i.e., sufficient facts
to lead a reasonable man to believe that evidence or fruits of crime
are located at the specific location named in the warrant.2  As a gen-
eral rule the scope of fourth amendment protection determines when
probable cause and a warrant are prerequisities to an officer's intru-
sive actions and conversely when suspicious circumstances and wild
hunches suffice to justify an officer's warrantless investigative intrusions.
Thus, the boundaries of fourth amendment protection reflect our so-
ciety's current balancing of the private citizen's rights of privacy and
security against the interest of the government in detecting and pre-
venting crime.3
This Comment will review the triggering mechanisms of fourth
amendment protection, particularly as they relate to an officer's intru-
sions onto a private citizen's real property. The focus will be upon the
"trespass" doctrine, i.e., an officer's physical trespass4 onto a person's
real property as a triggering device for fourth amendment protection.
In particular this Comment will consider the continued vitality of the
trespass doctrine after the decision in Katz v. United States,5 in which
the Court stated that fourth amendment protection would be triggered
whenever the government invaded a citizen's "reasonable expectation
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The generally recognized exceptions
to the warrant requirement can be found in Carroll v. United States, 267"U.S. 132 (1925) (scarch
of car stopped upon probable cause); Warden v. Hayden. 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit);
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (consent); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(search incident to arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (objects in plain
view); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (search of car for inventory purposes).
2. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
3. For a general discussion of the scope of fourth amendment protection. see Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974); Weinreib, Generalities
of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHi. L. REv. 47 (1974).
4. For the purposes of this paper, a trespass is any unauthorized entry upon or touching
of the property of another. See W. PROSSER, Tim LAW OF TORTS § 13 (4th ed. 1971).
5. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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of privacy." Although Katz was decided more than ten years ago, it is
still unclear whether the Katz rule merely supplements the trespass
doctrine or whether it completely supplants it. This Comment will
attempt to point out the limitations and weaknesses of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. Under the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test, it is easier for fourth amendment protection to be diminished
by pervasive governmental propaganda and by the particular court's
personal fourth amendment leanings. Additionally, the reasonable
expectation of privacy test fails to trigger fourth amendment protec-
tion in the situation in which the defendant's right to be secure in his
own home has been violated, but his right to privacy has not. The
trespass doctrine sets rigid limits of fourth amendment protection and
these limits are not susceptible to the weaknesses that plague the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test. For this reason this Comment will
suggest that the trespass doctrine should be applied in conjunction
with the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. In this way the
trespass doctrine will set the minimum level of fourth amendment pro-
tection, while the Katz rule will expand protection to those situations
in which a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy has been vio-
lated without an officer's physical trespass.
II. U.S. SUPREME COURT'S USE OF TRESPASS AS A
TRIGGERING DEVICE FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
A. The Trespass Doctrine
In 1924, the Supreme Court found a revenue agent's trespass
onto a defendant's property insufficient to trigger fourth amendment
protection. In Hester v. United States,6 the agent had trespassed
onto the defendant's land and had positioned himself in an open field
150 to 200 yards away from the defendant's home. From this posi-
tion he watched the defendant hand a bottle of moonshine to a wait-
ing customer. Rejecting the defendant's fourth amendment claim,
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, concluded that regardless of
a trespass, fourth amendment protection was "not extended to [events
observable from] the open fields." 7
Four years later in Olmstead v. United States,8 the Court set
forth the trespass doctrine for fourth amendment protection. The
doctrine was based on the concept that the fourth amendment pro-
tected "persons, houses, papers, and effects" when these entities were
located within a "constitutionally protected area." A constitutionally
protected area was a conclusory label used by the Court to connote
areas to which fourth amendment protection was extended. The
6. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
7. Id. at 59.
8. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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Court found that fourth amendment protection could only be triggered
when an officer made "an actual physical invasion of [the defendant's]
house 'or curtilage 9 for the purpose of making a seizure."' 0
In Olmstead, the Court found that no fourth amendment protec-
tion existed when the law enforcement agents tapped the defendant's
phone from the street without trespassing into the home or surround-
ing curtilage. Hence, lines had been drawn. A person's home, sur-
rounding yard, and other buildings within the curtilage were constitu-
tionally protected areas, while his open field was not. Thus, an
officer could trespass onto one's property and make a search if the of-
ficer did not physically invade a constitutionally protected area.
Beginning with Jones v. United States" in 1960, the Supreme
Court began to move away from basing its decisions on common law
property concepts, and suggested instead that the protection of pri-
vacy was at the heart of the fourth amendment's proscriptions. The
Court was troubled by the emergence of technological devices that
allowed enforcement officers to gather unvolunteered information with-
out a proscribable physical trespass.
The next year in Silverman v. United States,'2 the Supreme
Court refused to sanction the warrantless use of an electronic listen-
ing device that had been pushed through the party wall of an adjoining
house until it touched the heating ducts in the house occupied by the
defendants. Although there was a trespass onto the defendant's prop-
erty, the Court did not focus on the "ancient niceties of tort or real
property law.''13 Instead it found that "[a]t the very core [of the fourth
amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."'14  In Sil-
verman the government had invaded the privacy of the defendant's
home, which in turn had brought its actions within the proscriptions
of the fourth amendment.
B. Katz v. United States and its Impact on the Trespass Doctrine
1. The Holding
The stage had been set for Katz v. United States,15 the Supreme
Court's seminal decision dealing with the scope of fourth amend-
ment protection. In Katz, the Court held that the government's
9. The curtilage is a yard, courtyard or other piece of ground immediately surrounding a
dwelling house. Often this area is enclosed by a fence.
10. 277 U.S. at 466.
11. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
12. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
13. Id. at 511.
14. Id.
15. 389 U.S. 349 (1967).
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placement of an electronic listening device onto the exterior of a public
phone booth violated the defendant's fourth amendment right to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority in Katz, boldly stated that the fourth amendment pro-
tects "people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches
and seizures . . . [and] the reach of that Amendment cannot turn up-
on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given en-
closure. 16  The Court found that the government's activities in elec-
tronically eavesdropping on and recording the defendant's telephone
conversations without first obtaining a warrant violated the privacy
upon which the defendant justifiably relied. Justice Stewart's opin-
ion stated that the trespass doctrine could no longer be regarded as
controlling. Because the trespass doctrine was no longer the exclu-
sive test, the Court overruled two earlier decisions that had placed
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping devices outside the pro-
scription of the fourth amendment when these devices were installed
without entering onto the defendant's property.
17
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz set forth a two part
triggering test for fourth amendment protection: "[F]irst . . . a per-
son [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 08 Thus, Justice Harlan main-
tained that when the government invades a person's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, it must comply with the dictates of the fourth
amendment.
2. Clues From Katz Concerning the Vitalit,
of the Trespass Doctrine
The extent to which the Katz decision supplants the trespass doc-
trine remains unclear.' 9 This confusion results from the majority's
refusal to articulate any fourth amendment triggering mechanism.
Some lower federal courts have read Katz as expanding fourth amend-
ment protection by merely supplementing the trespass doctrine.2
On the other hand, some lower federal courts have focused upon
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion and have read Katz as complete-
ly replacing the trespass doctrine with the reasonable expectation of
privacy test.2 In determining which interpretation is correct, the
analysis should focus upon the rights and interests protected by the
16. Id. at 353.
17. Id. The court overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S 438 (1928) and Goldman
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
18. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 358.
20. See Sections t1I.B. and III.C. infra.
21. See Section III.A. infra.
[Vol. 38,709
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
fourth amendment as articulated by the Katz majority opinion. Once
these rights and interests are identified, one can determine which in-
terpretation is more apt to give protection to these rights and inter-
ests. That determination will provide substantial assistance in ascer-
taining the present status of the trespass doctrine.
Significantly the majority opinion in Katz declared that the fourth
amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of gov-
ernmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all."22 The Court's footnote in support
of this statement is unclearn.
The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any
more by having his property seized openly than by having it seized pri-
vately and by stealth . . . . And a person can be just as much, if not
more, irritated, and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a
policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home.
2 3
The footnote seems to indicate that the fourth amendment also pro-
tects a citizen's sense of dignity and his right of personal security.
The idea that the fourth amendment also protects one's right of per-
sonal security long antedated the decision in Katz. In the landmark
decision of Boyd v. United States,24 the Court stated that the fourth
amendment protected an individual's "indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property." '  And two years
after Katz in Davis v. Mississippi?6 the Court reaffirmed that the fourth
amendment protected a citizen's right of personal security.
Although the concepts of a right of privacy and a right of per-
sonal security overlap, they are not identical. A right of security re-
fers to a right to feel safe and a right to be free of unsettling and dis-
turbing intrusions by third parties. On the other hand, a right to
privacy refers to a right to keep certain personal information and ac-
tivities secret from third parties. Thus, situations do arise in which
one's right of privacy has not been violated, but one's right of personal
security has been violated.
From the foregoing analysis it seems evident that Katz should be
read as recognizing that the fourth amendment protects both one's
right of privacy and one's right of personal security. A triggering
test that is based solely on one's reasonable expectation of privacy
would be too restrictive a triggering mechanism. If the fourth amend-
22. 389 U.S. at 350.
23. Id. at 350 nA. This footnote is a quote from the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965).
24. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
25. Id. at 630.
26. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). There, the Court said: "Detention for fingerprinting may
constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police
searches and detentions." Id. at 727.
27. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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ment also protects one's interest in personal security, a test that trig-
gers fourth amendment rights when an officer physically trespasses
onto the defendant's property would serve to protect that interest
even when a privacy test failed to do so. Although the majority
opinion does not explicitly authorize a trespass triggering mecha-
nism, such a mechanism is not inconsistent Nvith its rationale.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, on the other hand,
suggests that the fourth amendment solely protects privacy interests.
Significantly, lower federal courts have seized upon Justice Harlan's
triggering device and have shied away from the inconclusive formulation
in Justice Stewart's majority opinion. In particular one segment of
Justice Harlan's opinion has been used to support the view that Katz
overruled the trespass doctrine. Explaining the implications of the
Katz rule in this segment, Justice Harlan wrote:
Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place wbere he expects pri-
vacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain
view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep
them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversation
in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the ex-
pectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
Cf. Hester v. United States.28
Although Justice Harlan's opinion does not explicitly reject dis-
tinctions based on the trespass doctrine, it provides a foundation for
that doctrine's circumvention. The just quoted section of Justice Har-
lan's opinion attempts to demonstrate that the Court's past decisions
were really based on considerations of privacy, and thus that the fourth
amendment analysis should focus solely upon these considerations.
The controlling question under Justice Harlan's analysis becomes not
whether a trespass has been committed, but whether the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy has been frustrated. Thus, in
situations involving a trespass but no violation of a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, some lower courts have used the Harlan passage
to support their assertion that the reasonable expectation of privacy
test must control and that there is no fourth amendment abridge-
ment.29
A footnote in the Katz majority opinion suggests that the major-
ity recognized the problem of applying one formula to all fourth
amendment problems. Justice Stewart noted that the Court's use of
"constitutionally protected areas" as a device to explain the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment "never suggested that this concept
28. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, use of Hester v. United
States strongly suggests that he believed that Hester's open field exception still maintained
vitality after Katz. For a further discussion of this point see Section II.A.2. infra.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 97
S.Ct. 114 (1976); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
918 (1976).
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[could] serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment
problem." 30  But the Court's rejection of the constitutionally pro-
tected areas test as a talismanic solution does not necessarily repudiate
its vitality in determining the scope of the fourth amendment. 1
Rather, the Court hnerely recognized the inability of one test to meet
all fourth amendment situations. This recognition militates against
the argument that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test
replaced all other fourth amendment triggering tests.32
C. United States Supreme Court Decisions Subsequent to Katz
Concerning the Relationship Between a Trespass and
Fourth Amendment Protection
1. The Court's Further Pronouncements on the
"Plain View" Exception
A year after the decision in Katz, the Supreme Court decided
Harris v. United States,33 a case dealing with the "plain view" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. Prior to Harris, the Court had sanc-
tioned a warrantless seizure of evidence when the police had a war-
rant to search a given area for specified objects and in the course of the
search came across some other incriminating article that was in plain
view. 34 The doctrine had also been applied when the police officer's
initial intrusion was authorized by an exception to the warrant re-
quirement and an incriminating article came within the plain view of
the officer. In Harris, the police officer's action did not fit within
either of these categories.
In Harris, the defendant's car was lawfully in police custody.
While performing his duty to protect the car, an officer opened the
front door in order to lock it. The officer saw the registration card
of the victim of a recent robbery on the metal stripping of the car. The
Court held: "It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." 36
This third category as exemplified by the holding in Harris has
been difficult to define. Three years after the decision in Harris, the
Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire7 attempted to mark out the
30. 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
31. See Section II.C.3. infra.
32. "In short, the common formula for Katz fails to capture Katz at any one point because
the Katz decision was written to resist captivation in any formula." Amsterdam, supra note 3.
at 385.
33. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
34. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931).
35. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
36. 390 U.S. at 236.
37. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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boundaries of the plain view exception. In the course of the opinion
the Court touched upon the Harris decision and appeared to set forth
two elements for the Harris exception. First, the officer's initial in-
trusion must be authorized "by some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused."3
Second, the officer must "inadvertently come across an incriminating
object."39 Under these circumstances the evidence may be seized with-
out a warrant.
Both elements are problematic. The plain view exception can
cut into the trespass doctrine whenever the court finds that an of-
ficer's trespass was based on "some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused."
The court, however, made no effort to define what a qualifying
"legitimate reason" would be. Thus, the limits of what may be a legit-
imate reason for being present are bounded only by the imagination
of the courts. For example, it is most probable that an officer's tres-
pass to make a general inquiry would constitute a legitimate reason.40
Because the legitimate reasons have not been defined, however, some
lower federal courts have upheld warrantless seizures of evidence upon
plain view grounds when the police officer trespassed onto the defen-
dant's property and the officer's activities went beyond a general in-
quiry.4'
Second, the Court's opinion does not define the degree of uncer-
tainty required to make a discovery of incriminating evidence by the
police inadvertent. 42  It is thus unclear whether the discovery of in-
criminating evidence must be completely unexpected or whether that
discovery can be suspected.43 Additionally, the Coolidge decision did
not state whether the inadvertence requirement is applicable when
an officer, standing outside of a constitutionally protected area, makes
an incriminating discovery while peering into a constitutionally pro-
tected area and trespasses onto the property to make a seizure.44 Thus,
38. Id. at 466.
39. Id.
40. See e.g., United States v. Knight, 451 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 US.
965 (1972).
41. See e.g., Nordskog v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1977). In that case the
police officer knocked on defendant's door to make a general inquiry. When the defendant
did not answer, the policeman peered into a window and saw incriminating evidence. Later
the defendant came to the door and invited the officers into the houe where the officers once
again spotted the incriminating evidence. The court held that the plain view exception
authorized the warrantless seizure of this evidence.
42. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAY. L. REV. 237, 244 (1972).
43. One interpretation suggests that a plain view sighting is not inadvertent when the
police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 244-45. This view has found
support in some lower federal court decisions. Eg., United States v. Artieri, 491 F.2d 440,
442 (2d Cir. 1974).
44. The relevance of the inadvertence requirement in this situation requires an assumption
that the concept of constitutionally protected areas maintains vitality in fourth amendment
analysis. See Section II. C.3 infra for a discussion of this point.
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if the Supreme Court is to firmly reassert the vitality of the trespass
doctrine, it must also clarify the relationship between the trespass
doctrine and the plain view exception.45
2. The United States Supreme Court Reasserts that the Fourth
Amendment Protects the Security of the Home-
Alderman v. United States
In the 1969 decision of Alderman v. United States46 the Supreme
Court was confronted with a unique situation in which the defendant's
personal right of privacy had not been violated, but his right to be
secure in his personally-owned business premise had been violated.
In Alderman the Government placed the business premises of one of
the defendants, Alderisio, under electronic surveillance. Apparently
the conversations of the two other codefendants, Alderman and Kolod,
were unlawfully overheard at that location. The conversations impli-
cated Alderisio in the crime of conspiring to transmit murderous threats
in interstate commerce. One of the issues was whether Alderisio had
standing to object to the use against him of information obtained
from illegal surveillance of his business premises, when he was neither
present at the premises nor a party to the overheard conversations.
The Court held that a property owner had standing to suppress
conversations that had occurred on his premises and had been over-
heard by government officials by the use of electronic eavesdropping
equipment, even when the property owner was not present and did not
participate in the conversation. The Court also held that codefendants
and coconspirators had no standing against the admission against them
of information that had been obtained through electronic surveillafice
unless the codefendant or coconspirator owned the premises where the
surveillance took place or was present when the surveillance occurred.4
Alderman adds two further points to this discussion of the trespass
45. For a further discussion of the problems connected with the Supreme Court's articula-
tion of the plain view exception see Comment, Constitutional Standards for Appying the Plain
View Doctrine, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 725 (1974); Note, "Plain View"-Anthing But Plain: Coolidge
Divides the Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 489 (1974).
46. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
47. Id. at 171-72. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960), in Mhich the
Court said:
In order to qualify as "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" one
must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was
directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of
evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.
Ordinarily then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the
legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if
the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion
of privacy.
See generally Trager and Lobenfeld, Law of Standing under the Fourth Amendment, 41
BROOKLYN L. REv. 421 (1975).
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doctrine. First, the personal security of the home maintained vitality
as a decisional factor in fourth amendment standing questions .4
Second, Justice Harlan's understanding of Katz was not shared by the
majority of the Alderman court.
Justice White's majority opinion based the property owner's
standing to suppress on the right of an owner to be secure in his own
home: "We do not deprecate Fourth Amendment rights. The security
of a person and property remains a fundamental value which law
enforcement officers must respect. 49 Turning to the words of the fourth
amendment, Justice White found that the amendment expressly pro-
tected the home50 from unreasonable searches and seizures. Although
he did not invoke the trespass doctrine-it would have been inapplicable
because the surveillance occurred without a trespass--he reasserted that
the owner of a home would be protected from intrusions into it even
when the owner was not present at the home and when those intrusions
did not invade his own personal expectation of privacy. The majority
concluded that Katz, by holding the fourth amendment protects per-
sons in their private conversations, "was [not] intended to withdraw any
of the protection which the Amendment extends to the home ....
Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed
with the majority that "if the police see a person's tangible property
while committing their trespass, they may not constitutionally use this
knowledge either to obtain a search warrant or to gain a conviction." 52
He dissented, however, from the Court's decision to grant standing to
the owner of the premises when the owner did not participate in the
particular conversation in any way. Justice Harlan stated:
[W]e should reject traditional property concepts entirely, and reinterpret
standing law in the light of the substantive principles developed in
Katz. Standing should be granted to every person who participates in a
conversation he legitimately expects will remain private-for it is such
persons that Katz protects. . . For granting property owners standing
does not permit them to vindicate intrusions upon their own privacy
His privacy is not at all disturbed by the fact that other people in
other places cannot speak without the fear of being overheard."s
48. It must be noted that the Alderman decision addressed only the issue of standing and
did not decide the defendant's claims on their merits. The decision nevertheless adds to our
understanding of the Katz rationale.
49. 394 U.S. at 175.
50. Although the government's intrusive action in Alderman occurred in the defendant's
business establishment, the court continually referred to the security of the home. Apparently
the Court felt that the added constitutional protection given to the home also applied to a
citizen's privately-owned business establishment.
51. 394 U.S. at 180.
52. Id. at 195 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
53. Id. at 191-93 (emphasis in original).
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The majority opinion in Alderman and Harlan's concurring and
dissenting opinion can be explained by their differing views of the Katz
holding. To Harlan, Katz stood for the proposition that the fourth
amendment solely protects a person's privacy interests. The majority,
on the other hand, did not limit Katz in that way. The Alderman
majority felt that while the fourth amendment primarily protects
privacy, it also protects other interests, including the security of the
home.54 From Alderman it can be inferred that to the extent that
property concepts allow the owner to vindicate the security of his own
home, they retain vitality for triggering fourth amendment protec-
tion.55
3. United States Supreme Court's Use of the Concept of
Constitutionally Protected Areas After
Katz v. United States
Although Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz stated that
the fourth amendment protects "people and not simply areas," the
Court since Katz has nonetheless occasionally used the concept of
constitutionally protected areas to analyze fourth amendment prob-
lems.
In the 1972 decision of Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western
Alfalfa Corp.56 the Supreme Court relied on the pre-Katz distinction
between a search conducted from an open field and one conducted
from within the curtilage or premises, and found no fourth amendment
protection existed when the intrusion was only upon the complainant's
open field. In Air Pollution, an inspector for the Colorado Depart-
ment of Health entered upon the defendants' outdoor premises in
order to take an opacity test for the smoke being emitted from the
defendants' chimneys. The defendants claimed that this warrantless
action was an unreasonable search violative of the fourth amendment.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, noted that the inspector
was on the defendant's property. However, "[h'e had sighted what
anyone in the city who was near the plant could see in the sky-plumes
of smoke. The Court in Hester v. United States. ... speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes, refused to extend the Fourth Amendment
to sights seen in 'the open fields.' ,57 The majority's use of the open
fields exception indicates that constitutionally protected areas are
still useful to the Court's fourth amendment analysis.
54. One commentator argues that Justice Harlan's position is the most consistent with
the Katz holding. Note, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy- Katz v. United States- A Postscrip-
tion, 9 IND. L. REv. 468 (1976).
55. "So far as I can tell, the Supreme Court has not applied Katz to refuse fourth amend-
ment protection in any case in which protection would have been afforded under pre-Kat:
standards." Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 460 n.349.
56. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
57. Id. at 865.
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As recently as 1976 the Court in United States v. Miller"8 ap-
parently reaffirmed the validity of the concept of constitutionally pro-
tected areas. In rejecting the argument that bank records obtained
by an invalid subpoena were to be suppressed, the Court found both
that there was no intrusion into any area in which the respondent had a
protected fourth amendment interest and that the respondent had no
legitimate expectation of privacy for bank records. 59 It seems therefore
that the Court is not yet willing to rely upon the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test as the sole test of fourth amendment protection.
III. THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRESPASS AND
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AFTER
Katz v. United States
The preceding discussion has shown that the Supreme Court has
not expressly defined the relationship between the trespass doctrine
and the reasonable expectation of privacy test. This section will
investigate how the lower federal courts have viewed the vitality of
the trespass doctrine after Katz.
A. The Trespass Doctrine-Its Complete Replacement After Katz
by Harlan's Reasonable Expectation of Privac' Test
1. The Seventh Circuit's Technical Trespass Doctrine
The Seventh Circuit has completely replaced the trespass doc-
trine with Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy test.
In so doing, it has withdrawn fourth amendment protection from areas
that would have been protected before the decision in Katz. In par-
ticular, when the Seventh Circuit has found that the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy was not violated, it has dismissed
an officer's trespass into a constitutionally protected area as being
merely a "technical trespass" and not dispositive of fourth amendment
protection.
The Seventh Circuit first introduced the concept of a "technical
trespass" in United States v. Hanahan.60 In Hanahan the Seventh
Circuit found inconsequential an officer's trespass onto the curtilage
surrounding the defendant's garage. The defendant sought to suppress
the evidence obtained when the police officer peeked into an uncovered
58. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
59. Id. at 440-43. See United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C, Cir. 1977). in which the
court referred to this apparent two-step analysis: "This analysis can only be read to reflect a
refutation of the Government's argument that trespasses are irrelevant to Fourth Amendment
analysis when ancillary to electronic surveillance. The Amendment protects people by pro.
tecting certain expectations of privacy which relate to private physical areas as well as con-
versations." Id. at 157 n.43.
60. 442 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971).
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window to view the interior of a garage leased by the defendant. The
officer had spotted a particular automobile that matched the descrip-
tion of an automobile that had been used in a recent robbery. The
prosecution claimed that the officer was standing on a private sidewalk
commonly used by patrons of a nearby pizzeria when he looked into
the garage, while the defendant claimed that the officer was standing
on the curtilage, which consisted of a few inches of grass between the
sidewalk and the garage.
The court began its analysis by asking whether the officer had a
right to be in the position to peek into the garage window, citing
Harris v. United States. The use of Harris is problematic, because
the officer in Hanahan entered onto the defendant's property expressly
to search for evidence against the defendant.61  Thus, the officer's
initial intrusion was not the result of some legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused. 62
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that if the officer's position did not
frustrate the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, the officer
had a right to be in that position. Focusing on the first part of Justice
Harlan's two part test, the court apparently found that the defendant
did not subjectively intend to keep the garage and its contents private.
The court reasoned that although the defendant kept the garage locked,
a few of his friends and his landlord had access to it. Additionally the
defendant had not boarded up two of the three garage windows,
and the only window that was covered had been covered by a previous
lessee.
The court held that the officer was standing on the frequently
used private sidewalk when he made his view, but accepted for the
purposes of argument that the officer had stepped onto the curtilage.
The court declared that even if the officer had stepped onto the "'few
inches of grass between the sidewalk and the garage itself,' . . it
was no more than a technical trespss on the part of the officer."6 3
The opinion did not define the term "technical trespass." Rea-
soning from the facts in Hanahan, the phrase is susceptible to three
meanings. First, a trespass may be technical if the officer has moved
only a short distance from a place in which he has a right to be.
64
Second, a trespass may be technical if the defendant fails to take
precautions to make the premises private.65 Third, if the officer could
61. See Section II.C.I. supra.
62. It is also questionable whether the police officer's plain %iew in ilanahan was in-
advertent. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
63. 442 F.2d at 654.
64. This was the interpretation the phrase was given in United States v. Johnson. No.
73-2221 (D.C. Cir. en banc January 12, 1977), in which the majority opinion lifted the phrase
"technical trespass" from the Seventh Circuit opinions.
65. In two recent state court decisions involving the plain siew exception, the courts hase
apparently based their holding on this same belief that the defendants must take affirmatise
action to secrete evidence from the plain view of officers in order to preserve their fourth amend-
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have seen the incriminating evidence equally well from a place where
he had a right to make a view, the trespass is technical.66
In 1973, two years after the decision in Hanahan, the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Connor67 once again relied on the technical
trespass doctrine. In Connor the officer stood on the grass between the
garage and an alley and viewed activities inside the garage through
an opened overhanging door. The activities inside the well-lighted
garage could be seen from either the alley or the curtilage. Stating
its rationale tersely, the court upheld the officer's warrantless search
from the curtilage:
[T]he interior of the garage was clearly visible through the open overhead
door from outside the building. . . .Under these circumstances, the de-
fendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Even if the officers
were on the apron, which was not fenced off from the alley, we think that
a mere "technical trespass" did not transform an otherwise reasonable
investigation into an unreasonable search.68
The court's use of the phrase "technical trespass" was again
capable of the three interpretations mentioned earlier, but two of the
interpretations seem more probable upon a review of the fact situa-
tion and the opinion. It appears that if the officer could just as easily
view the evidence from the alley, a place where he had a right to be,
any trespass on the property to make that same view would be a
technical trespass. The court also hinted that a technical trespass
occurs when the officer steps into an area that the defendants did not
take affirmative steps to make private, because the court suggested that
the defendants could have put a fence around the curtilage if they
wanted it to remain private.
The Seventh Circuit's use of the phrase "technical trespass" was
somewhat clarified in United States v. Alewelt. 69  The defendant left
his coat on a coat rack in his mother's office at the Illinois Department
of Public Health. In the jacket pocket and apparently clearly visible
were a white cloth cap and several bundles of money in wrappers. It
appears that at first the officers did not see the coat from the public
hallway, but discovered the incriminating evidence when they were in
the office looking through the mother's waste paper can after hours.
ment rights. George v. Texas, 509 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (officer's search
conducted by looking through knot holes in a fence came within the plain view exception),
California v. Hill, 31 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 107 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1973 , (officers standing on the
defendant's front porch had a right to observe whatever could be seen through a front window,
provided that they did not make or enlarge the opening through which they looked) rhese
two cases indicate that this rule is susceptible to substantial abuse.
66. In other words, under the third interpretation if the officer could have seen the in.
criminating object from a position to which the plain view exception applied, the trespas was
technical.
67. 478 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1973).
68. Id. at 1323.
69. 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 114 (1976).
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They had entered the office with the consent of a janitor and once they
saw the coat, they seized it along with the incriminating items.
The court began its analysis by quoting from Katz: "Whatever
a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. 70  The court reasoned that the coat
rack was so placed that a person in the public hall could see through
the open doorway without actually entering the room and concluded:
"The agents' limited intrusion into the office with the janitor's consent,
while it may have been a technical trespass against the State of Illi-
nois, did not violate any interest of defendant that was subject to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.'
Once again the three interpretations of the technical trespass
doctrine were possible upon the facts of the case. The court empha-
sized, however, that the officer could have viewed the evidence from
the hallway, which was a place where he had a right to be. 7" If this
was the key fact, then Alewelt reveals that a trespass is technical
when the officer could have viewed the evidence from a location in which
he was not a trespasser.
Connors and Hanahan had intimated that the inadvertence of the
officer's trespass was relevant, but Aleivelt indicated that a trespass is
still technical when the officer intentionally enters onto the property
of another, since in Alewelt the officers intentionally entered the private
office of the defendant's mother." In any event, in Hanahan, Connor,
and Alewelt the Seventh Circuit has established that if the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy is not invaded, the officer's intrusion
onto his property is a mere technical trespass and the ensuing search
is not violative of the fourth amendment. Thus, it is fair to say that
the trespass doctrine has met its demise in the Seventh Circuit, and
the reasonable expectation of privacy test is alone controlling.
2. The Effect of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy as the
Exclusive Test Upon the Open Fields Exception
to the Trespass Doctrine
When one's reasonable expectation of privacy is the controlling
test and distinctions between house, curtilage, and open fields disap-
pear, the effect is to overrule Hester v. United States.'4 In the district
70. Id. at 1168 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
71. 532 F.2d at 1168.
72. See United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766. 768 (7th Cir. 1970). in %hich the court said
that a place where the officer has a right to be is synonyNmous with a place iAhere the public is
entitled to be.
73. Accord, United States v. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1976). cert. denied. 97 S. C1.
1556 (1977), in which the officer saw a stolen car in a garage from the sidewalk of defendants
home after making a general inquiry at the front door. The officers trespass to reach the
garage and peer into it was intentional, but was still labeled as technical.
74. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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court decision of Gedko v. Heer 5 the Hester open fields exception
was found uncontrolling for this precise reason. In Heer, the officers
hid themselves at the edge of the timberline on the defendant's prop-
erty, 300 to 400 feet from the defendant's farm buildings. From this
vantage point in the open fields, the officers overheard the defendant's
incriminating statements to his wife and watched him attempt to hide
his home-grown marijuana crop when a government plane flew over
his property at a very low altitude.
The prosecution based its arguments on Hester v. United States,
stating that fourth amendment protection did not extend to the open
fields. The Katz opinion, they argued, abolished trespass as the
controlling element in determining fourth amendment protection in
constitutionally protected areas. They maintained that Katz did not
address governmental intrusion in the open fields because the open
fields had never been a constitutionally protected area. The prosecu-
tion bolstered its argument by citing the post-Katz decision of Air
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.7 6 The prosecution
noted that in Air Pollution the Supreme Court held on the authority
of Hester that a state air pollution inspector could enter the defendant's
open fields to make a smoke test. Thus, the prosecution argued that
Hester was still very much alive.
The court rejected the prosecution's Hester argument and found
that the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy had been vio-
lated. The court first distinguished Hester. In the court's view the
effect of Katz was to make the area in which the intrusion took place
one of the several factors to be considered when the court evaluated
the reasonableness of the defendant's expectation of privacy. In the
court's opinion Hester retained little independent meaning, being
limited to the proposition that open fields were not areas in which one
traditionally could have expected privacy. While a court might view
more skeptically an assertion that one expected privacy for events
observable from an open field, the final determination of the privacy
issue required a close examination of all the facts. The court also
dismissed the theory that Air Pollution controlled the continued
vitality of the open fields exception. The court reasoned that in Air
Pollution, the defendant could have no reasonable expectation of
privacy concerning his smokestack emissions because they were plainly
visible to anyone in the city who was near the plant. Hence, the
court concluded that any reference to Hester in Justice Douglas'
majority opinion in Air Pollution was unnecessary to the holding.
The court then took Justice Harlan's test to its logical conclusion
by striking the death blow for Hester in the context of this particular
75. 406 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
76. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
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fact situation. The court looked at all of the facts to determine first
whether the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in this
situation and, second, whether society was prepared to recognize that
expectation as reasonable. The court answered both questions affirma-
tively. It found that the defendant's 160 acre farm was woody and hilly
and located in a rural section of Wisconsin, that the petitioner's
property was fenced, and that the law enforcement officers without
consent entered onto his property by climbing over a fence. The
nearest public road was six tenths of a mile from the farm yard and a
"No Trespassing" sign was posted on the property at the gate where
the lane intersected with the highway. The court concluded that the
petitioner had a reasonable, exhibited and justifiable expectation of
privacy concerning his activities and conversations not observable or
audible beyond the boundaries of his own property. Thus, the de-
fendant's fourth amendment protection extended to the open fields of
his property.77
3. An Analysis of the Exclusive Use of the Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy Test for Fourth Amendment Problems
Justice Harlan's capsulization of the Katz holding is susceptible
to three major criticisms. The first prong of Justice Harlan's trig-
gering mechanism asks whether the defendant actually had an expec-
tation of privacy that was frustrated by the government's intrusive
actions. Unfortunately, the government can manipulate that subjective
expectation by the forms of surveillance it commonly employs and the
types of police tactics it generally uses. For example, one writer,
expressing his concern over the pliability of a rule based on subjective
expectations, states: "If it could, the government could diminish each
person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-
hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and
that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive elec-
tronic surveillance." 78 Even Justice Harlan appeared to have similar
thoughts about his Katz formulation. Dissenting in United States v.
White, 79 he wrote: "The analysis must, in my view, transcend the
search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions
of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules, the customs and values
of the past and present."80
The second part of Justice Harlan's test asks the court to deter-
mine whether society is willing to recognize the defendant's expecta-
77. But see United States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 416 U.S.
909 (1974); Patler v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Va. 1973).
78. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 384.
79. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
80. Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tion of privacy as reasonable. This aspect of the test is almost an open
invitation to the judge to allow his personal fourth amendment philos-
ophy and conceptual notion of societal values to play an important
role in determining the defendant's fourth amendment rights. This
factor also allows the court to manipulate its analysis to reach the
result it feels is just in a particular situation. Although the latter
criticism can be levied against any test that uses a reasonableness
standard, the problem is much more acute in the area of fourth amend-
ment objections to evidence. Often the seized evidence is the heart of
the prosecution's case and without it, the prosecution would be unable
to secure a conviction. Additionally, once admitted, illegally seized
evidence does not distort the accuracy of the fact-finding process. 81
In fact, it is often highly probative of guilt. The court must fight the
temptation to find the search and seizure constitutional, especially
when the seized evidence overwhelmingly indicates the defendant's
guilt. Thus, the second part of Harlan's test supplies the court with a
fudge factor that can dictate the outcome of the fourth amendment
challenge.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Fisch82 is an ex-
ample of the test's susceptibility to abuse. At issue was the admis-
sibility of the defendant's conversations in his motel room that were
overheard by government agents. The agents testified that occa-
sionally they could overhear the defendant's conversations in their
adjoining room but the bulk of the statements were overheard when
an officer crouched in the hallway outside the defendant's motel room.
By placing his ear near the crack of the door, the agent was able to
overhear and transcribe much of the defendant's conversations. The
court first found that the defendants did not demonstrate a subjective
expectation of privacy. It also found that society was not prepared
to recognize as reasonable the defendant's expectation that no police
officer would be listening to their conversations in a crouched position
six inches away from their motel room door. The court noted the
nontrespassing technique used for obtaining the information, the
absence of artificial means of probing, and the gravity of the offense
(the smuggling of marijuana). The importance of the latter two
factors is indeed questionable. Thus, the case serves as an example
of how the Harlan triggering mechanism can be molded to the judge's
particular proclivities.
Finally, Justice Harlan's formulation does not take into account
that other interests besides privacy are protected by the fourth amend-
ment. Justice Harlan's test would not protect a defendant in a situa-
tion similar to Alderman v. United States83 where the defendant's
81. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
82. 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
83. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). For a discussion of Alderman, see section lI.C.2. supra,
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personal privacy was not violated, but his right to be secure in his
own home was infringed.
B. The Trespass Doctrine-Its Vitality After Katz
in Constitutionally Protected Areas Based on the Right
of Security in One's Own Home
1. The Continued Vitality of the Trespass Doctrine
in the Fifth Circuit
An officer's trespass into the home or its curtilage continues to
trigger fourth amendment protection under a view adopted by the
Fifth Circuit. Underlying this rule is the belief that the fourth amend-
ment protects the sanctity of the home and the right of the individual
to be left alone in his own home. Thus, the trespass doctrine is a
convenient way of preserving those interests.
The rule originated in a 1955 pre-Katz decision, Brock v. United
States. 4 Revenue agents had observed the operations of a still for
several days and had arrested three men at the still. Believing that
there was additional evidence at a house a quarter of a mile away, the
officers entered onto the curtilage of the home and peered into the
windows. The court in suppressing the evidence obtained by this
illegal search said: "Whatever quibbles there may be as to where the
curtilage begins and ends, clear it is that standing on a man's premises
and looking in his bedroom window is a violation of his 'right to be left
alone' as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."85
In United States v. Davis,86 a 1970 post-Katz decision, the prin-
ciples of Brock were reaffirmed. In Davis, law enforcement officers
returned to the defendant's premises at about 10:30 p.m. to search for a
gun that had been discarded by the defendant in a melee that had
occurred on the premises earlier that afternoon. The government
claimed that a search warrant was not required because the gun was in
plain view. The court noted that the plain view rule only applied when
the officer had a right to be in the position to have that view. Because
the officer had had to trespass into a constitutionally protected area in
order to secure that view, the court quickly dismissed the government's
argument.
The court did not consider Katz in determining the scope of fourth
amendment protection. It stated: "The high degree of judicial sanctity
which the courts have accorded to dwellings is based upon the con-
cept of privacy and the right to be left alone. The security of homes
should not be left to the sole discretion of police officers."8 7 Implicit
84. 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
85. Id. at 685.
86. 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970).
87. Id. at 977.
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in the court's rationale is the belief that the fourth amendment protects
both the security of the home and the individual's right of privacy."8
The trespass doctrine was used by the court because it gave the home
extra protection from governmental intrusion. 89
Consistent with this rationale is the Fifth Circuit's refusal to uti-
lize the trespass doctrine when the additional justification of protection
of the home is absent. The Fifth Circuit has held that a warrantless
search of a car in order to find its Public Vehicle Identification Num-
ber does not fall within the proscription of the fourth amendment even
though it involves a technical trespass. In United States v. Polk"0 the
court noted that the car was unlocked, that the officer did not do dam-
age to the car in making the inspection, that the search did not extend
to the private area of the automobile, and that there was no seizure of
the car. The court also stated that the officer had not trespassed onto
the defendant's real property, noting that the car was located in a re-
pair garage, the owner of which gave the officer permission to check the
car.
In this situation the court concluded that the only interest that
possibly could have been invaded was the owner',; interest in privacy.
The court refused to apply the trespass doctrine and found that an
automobile owner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
concerning the car's vehicle identification number. 91 Thus, the court
implicitly recognized that the trespass doctrine is a doctrine that gives
protection beyond privacy to those constitutionally protected areas
that are covered by additional rationales.
2. Problems with the Fifth Circuit Approach
The word trespass indiscriminately applies to all acts by officers
when they enter onto a defendant's premises without his consent, re-
gardless of the intention of the officer. The Fifth Circuit has recog-
nized the overinclusiveness of a pure trespass doctrine, and has found
that a fourth amendment search does not occur when an officer merely
enters the property to make a general inquiry.
In United States v. Knight92 the police received a tip from a reli-
able informant that stolen property would be unloaded in the 2900
block of Klondike in Dallas, Texas. A pickup truck with a trailer was
88. For a discussion of the difference between a right of privacy and a right of security. see
the text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
89. See Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the Fifth Circuit
applied the trespass doctrine rationale to a common fenced-in backyard serving an apartment
complex shared by four households. The opinion was based upon thz sanctity of the home and
the right to be left alone.
90. 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970).
91. Id. at 647-48.
92. 451 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
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spotted being unloaded at 2918 Klondike a few hours later. The of-
ficers got out of their patrol car in order to ask the men unloading
the truck a few questions. On their way to the garage, the officers
spotted the labelling on the cartons piled outside of the truck and rec-
ognized the cartons as stolen goods. Simultaneously, as the men saw
the police approaching, all but one ran from the scene. The officers
questioned the man who remained on the scene. The court upheld
the search and seizure because the evidence was spotted inadvertently
when the officers entered onto the property to make a general inquiry.
The line between a search and a general inquiry is difficult to draw.
It appears that the subjective intent of the police officer controls the
distinction. If in making a general inquiry the officer approaches the
house and knocks on the front door93 or approaches human activity in
the yard, then the officer has a right to be in that position. If any
evidence falls within his plain view while in that position, it is seiz-
able without a warrant. If, on the other hand, the officer enters the
property looking solely for evidence of crime, then the officer's pres-
ence constitutes a search within the proscription of the fourth amend-
ment.
94
The general inquiry rule is susceptible to abuse. An officer may
enter onto the premises with the intent to look for incriminating evi-
dence; however, if he masks his trespass in the clothing of a general
inquiry, it will be permissible. Nevertheless, the trespass doctrine
still has much bite to it. Because the officer's subjective intent will be
analyzed from his objective acts, the doctrine will still curb the unre-
strained curiosities of an officer who surreptitiously skulks around the
defendant's yard searching for evidence.
C. Trespass-As a Per Se Invasion qf One's Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy
Some courts have recognized that property values lie at the cen-
ter of one's right of privacy.95 The two are so intertwined that the
invasion of one's property rights by a trespass also violates one's pri-
vacy rights. This relationship has led some courts to come very close
to adopting a per se rule that an officer's trespass always invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
The strongest formulation of the rule is found in Chief Judge
Bazelon's dissenting opinion in United States v. Johnson.96 In John-
93. See Foster v. United States, 296 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1962).
94. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975). arflrned en bane. 537 F.2d
227 (5th Cir. 1976).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545. 549 (6th Cir. 1976): United States
v. Hunt, 505 F.2d 931, 937 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975).
96. No. 73-2221 (D.C. Cir. en banc Jan. 12 1977). By court rule, the decision does not
have precedential value. 547 F.2d 706-07 (1977).
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son, the police received an anonymous phone tip that a narcotics
violation could be seen by looking through the right front window of a
particular urban dwelling. Two officers responded to the tip, walked up
the private sidewalk toward the front door, and saw light coming from
the right front basement window. One officer took two or three steps
off the sidewalk, peered into the basement window for ten seconds,
and saw the defendants "cutting" 97 heroin. The prosecution argued
that the warrantless search and seizure was justified because it fell
within the plain view exception. The majority found that the police
acted reasonably in this circumstance and overlooked the intrusion
onto the yard, labelling it a technical trespass that was minimal in
distance. A concurring opinion focused on the location of the defen-
dants' activities and found that the defendants' actions, which could
be seen from the private sidewalk, were exposed to the public, and
the officer's trespass did not invade the defendants' reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.98
Chief Judge Bazelon in his dissent noted that at one time the
fourth amendment protected only against a physical trespass, but that
Katz v. United States expanded the protection of that amendment,
holding that people and not places came within its ambit. Taking aim
at the affirming judges' use of Katz v. United States to deny the defen-
dants' claims, Chief Judge Bazelon said:
[Tlhe majority today in effect states that a person does not always have a
reasonable expectation that he will not be spied upon by a trespassing
police officer, thereby converting an expansion of the Fourth Amendment
into a contraction. Contrary to the majority, I think it is reasonable for
a person to expect his activities to be safe from the eye of a person who
must trespass to view him. In light of the narrowness of the warrant ex-
ceptions I doubt the government would ever be able to iustify a search on
plain view grounds when it was necessary for the officer to trespass in
order to achieve the view.99
Chief Judge Bazelon came tantalizingly close to saying that a
trespass is a per se invasion of one's reasonable expectation of privacy,
but he refrained from expressly stating it. Chief Judge Bazelon did
make clear, however, that the government must sustain the burden of
proving that the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy has not
been violated, and noted that the government could only justify the
warrantless search when it also sustained the burden of establishing
the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement. In
short, the police officer's trespass, unaided by an exception, established
a very strong presumption that the defendant's reasonable expecta-
97. Cutting heroin refers to the process of dividing the bulk of heroin and preparing the
narcotics for distribution.
98. No. 73-2221 (D.C. Cir. en banc Jan. 12, 1977) (Leventhal, J.. concurring).
99. Id. slip op. at 12-13 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
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tion of privacy had been invaded. Because Chief Judge Bazeion's
theory is only roughed out on the last few pages of his dissent, it is
impossible to predict whether he would apply this fourth amendment
theory outside the setting of the home.
Closely akin to Chief Judge Bazelon's view is the position of the
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Carriger.100 In Carriger, narcotics
officers trailed one Beasley, in an attempt to find the source of his
heroin supply. Officers followed Beasley to an apartment house in
which the front and back entrance doors could only be opened by a
key or by someone inside activating a buzzer system. One officer
waited for some workmen to leave the building and slipped into the
building before the door closed. Beasley spotted the agent and walked
quickly to the defendant's apartment where he apparently returned a
green shopping bag to the defendant. The agent witnessed the passing
of the bag from his vantage point in the apartment hall. The defen-
dant sought to suppress the evidence obtained by the officer's entrance
into the building and consequent observations.
The court suppressed the evidence. According to the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the determination in Katz that the trespass doctrine was no longer
controlling was intended to expand the protection afforded by the
fourth amendment: "Katz, considered with the case law before it,
should be read as holding that trespassing is one form of intrusion
by the Government that may violate a person's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy." 101 Quoting from a Fifth Circuit decision,'0 2 the court
explained that property concepts were helpful to an investigation of
one's reasonable expectation of privacy because they assisted in es-
tablishing the perimeters of fourth amendment protection as they con-
cern the home. The court stated that a tenant expects other tenants
and invited guests to enter into the common areas of the building but
does not expect trespassers to do the same. The trespass of the of-
ficer violated the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy and the
court found that expectation reasonable.
The Sixth Circuit left open the possibility that in another situa-
tion it might not show as much deference to property concepts. The
court said: "[W]e do not hold today that any evidence gained as a re-
sult of a federal agent's trespass constitutes an illegal search and sei-
zure."' °3 The court thus implicitly recognized the overbreadth of the
trespass doctrine. But neither the Sixth Circuit nor Chief Judge
Bazelon has resolved the problem of balancing citizens' property
100. 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976).
101. Id. at 549.
102. The court quoted from Fxel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974).
103. 541 F.2d at 549-50.
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rights and police officers' duties to gather information by making gen-
eral inquiries.1
0 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States was
intended to expand rather than contract fourth amendment protec-
tion. The implications of the majority opinion, however, have been
widely forgotten, especially its suggestion that the fourth amendment
goes beyond the protection of privacy interests. Furthermore, the
majority opinion intimated that no one triggering test could serve as
a talismanic guide to the scope of fourth amendment protection.
Some lower federal courts have seized upon the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test as the sole method of determining the scope
of the fourth amendment. Exclusive reliance upon the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test appears to be unwise, because the test has
several glaring weaknesses. First, the test hinges upon the defen-
dant's subjective expectation of privacy, an expectation that over time
can be diminished by pervasive governmental intrusion and propa-
ganda. Second, the court's determination of the reasonableness of
the defendant's subjective expectation permits the judge's personal
fourth amendment philosophy to play a large role in determining the
scope of fourth amendment protection. This has the effect of produc-
ing irreconcilable results in different jurisdictions although the deci-
sions are based on almost identical fact patterns.10 5 Finally, the test
fails to trigger fourth amendment protection in the situation in which
a defendant's right to security, but not his right to privacy, has been
violated.
On the other hand, the reasonable expectation of privacy test
permits a flexibility that was unknown before the decision in Katz.
The problem lies in establishing minimum standards of protection
beyond which that flexibility can operate. This Comment has urged
that the trespass doctrine should establish the minimum limits of
fourth amendment protection for the citizen's home and business
premises. That doctrine should be used in conjunction with the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test in order to trigger protection in
those situations in which a warrantless intrusion occurs without a
physical trespass.
The use of this dual test, however, should not be expected to
serve as a "talismanic solution" to all fourth amendment problems
concerning the real property owner. Situations may arise in which
104. See Section III.B.2. supra.
105. For example, a comparison of United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass.
1976) with United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 97 S. Ct. 533 (1976)
and United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800 (W,D. Oki. 1976) reveals disagreement over
whether the placing of an electronic beeper in contraband or onto a vehicle invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
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fourth amendment protection should be extended even though pro-
tection was not triggered by either the trespass doctrine or the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test. But the Supreme Court's reaf-
firmation of the trespass doctrine in the context of the home would at
least serve to guard the security of the home, an important fourth
amendment interest that is not always protected by the reasonable
expectation of privacy test.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the fourth amendment's
protection goes further than privacy interests, and has accorded the
sanctity of the home extra protection by refusing to apply the plain
view exception when the officer has trespassed in order to gain the in-
criminating view. In effect it has retained the trespass doctrine.
Beyond that the Fifth Circuit has also attempted to balance the
interests of officers in making criminal investigations and the right of
a citizen to be secure in his home by carving out a general inquiry
exception to the trespass doctrine. When the Supreme Court finally
decides the relationship between a trespass and fourth amendment
protection after Katz, the Fifth Circuit's sound approach should be
given great deference.
David P. Miraldi
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